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Abstract
This paper aims to build and empirically evaluate a discrete choice model
of merger remedies as a basis for policy analysis. The database consists of 229
merger cases accepted in Phase I or Phase II of the European merger process be-
tween 1990 and 2005. We focus on the following question: Which merging firms’
characteristics lead the European Commission to decide whether to require con-
ditional acceptance? Although a lot of empirical studies have been carried out
these last years, ours is distinguished by at least two original features. First,
we explore determinanting factors of the Commission’s decisions with a neural
network model differentiating cases accepted with or without remedies (either
structural or behavioral). Secondly, we implement three multinomial logit mod-
els. We find that variables related to high market power lead more frequently
to a remedy outcome, whatever the phase. Innovative industries such as energy,
transportation and communications positively affect the probability of a behav-
ioral remedy. Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s policy
appears to be pro-remedy, i.e. seeking concessions from merging parties.
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Introduction
In October 2005 the Antitrust Section of the European Commission (EC) published
a long-awaited study that assessed the efficiency of merger remedies between 1996-
2000, i.e. commitments imposed on the merging firms to get the operation accepted.1
This study follows the one made by the U.S. antitrust agency – the FTC – that had
stressed problems with divestitures.2 Actually when a merger raises some anticompet-
itive concerns, the authority has the possibility of proposing conditional acceptance,
i.e. the authority imposes commitments on merging parties as a condition to accept
the merger. This means is called a remedy which has been traditionally distinguished
into two basic forms: One addresses the market structure (structural remedies), the
other the merged firm’s behavior (behavioral remedies). Structural remedies generally
involve assets divestitures (physical or intangible assets) by the merging firms. Also,
new competitors can be created through the sale or licensing of assets if an existing
competitor for some reason doesn’t purchase divested assets. A behavioral remedy
usually entails injunctive provisions that would manage or regulate the merged firm’s
post-merger business conduct. In some cases – often in high-tech markets – the com-
petition concern may require both structural and conduct relief.3
The European report suggested that merger remedies had permitted more concen-
trations to be accepted but highlighted a series of flaws in their design and implemen-
tation.4 The analysis was based on interviews with merging parties, competitors and
trustees. Moreover, the European agency has to face recent questioning about the
validity of its merger control. Often stigmatized for its tough decisions, the EC has
been questioned by three annulments of its merger prohibitions by the Court of First
Instance.5 Thus, it seems appropriate to look into the motives of the EC’s criteria.
Does the authority decide in accordance with general economic principles and IO the-
ory? Or does it adopt more of a case-by-case approach? In either case, the interesting
question is the following: Do merging firms have the possibility of planning a better
strategy that avoids high litigation costs or a devastating effect on their brand image?
We’ll see the answer is not straightforward.
Here we target a more technical analysis of factors that can influence the EC’s
decision-making process when facing an anticompetitive concern. As Monti (2003),
former Competition Commissioner at the EC, claimed that “the vast majority of the
competition concerns that had arisen in merger cases had been addressed by means of
divestitures”, researchers and practitioners had to cover the issue in deeper detail.
In order to estimate the relationship between merger remedy decisions and market
1Merger Remedies Study, DG COMP, European Commission, October 2005. See Kopke (2005)
for a summary.
2A Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process, Federal Trade Commission, 1999.
3See Motta (2004).
4For instance, the scope of the divested business, the viability of the purchaser, and strategic
behaviors between sellers and purchasers can raise serious concerns about the efficiency of some
remedies.
5The famous Airtours/First Choice, TetraLaval/Sidel and Schneider/Legrand merger cases.
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structure variables, as well as political variables, we built a database including 229
merger cases accepted in Phase I or in Phase II between 1990 and 2005.6 In order
to explore the database in detail, we first use Kohonen’s maps issued from neural
networks research. Then, we present main results of three multinomial logit (MNL)
models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides an overview of how economists
have tried to evaluate the accuracy of antitrust agency decisions. Section 2 contains
the description of the model and the database we built. Lastly, Section 3 reports the
results.
1 How to measure antitrust agency’s efficiency
In determining whether a proposed transaction is likely to substantially lessen compe-
tition, the antitrust agency has to address a number of economic issues, particularly
the well-known tradeoff between market power and efficiency gain and the protec-
tion of consumers’ interests.7 This section overviews the main variables used by the
authority when it faces a merger proposal.
Actually the first attempt at assessing the efficiency of a competition authority was
Posner’s seminal work (1970). He studied the correlation between business cycles and
the number of cases filed to the Department of Justice (DOJ). He found some signif-
icant positively-correlated variables such as the GDP and the authority budget; the
only negatively-correlated variable was the “war period”.8 Posner’s work encouraged
further empirical research and gave birth to a large number of studies.
1.1 Different approaches to assessing an antitrust authority
 Cost-benefit analysis. The prolific empirical literature on antitrust began with
the cost/benefit approach, which was first carried out by Long et al. (1973), Asch
(1975), and Siegfried (1975). They were interested in quantifying welfare variations
linked to antitrust regulation. Profit industries were classified by estimating the clas-
sic deadweight loss (Harbeger, 1954) due to market power. Costs mainly included
litigation costs initiated by the government. They all used a basic model to assess
6Thus, the period covers the beginning of the new merger regulation passed in 2004. See, for
instance, Lyons (2004) for further details about the procedure.
7As Competition Commissioner for the EU Ms. Neelie Kroes says “Our aim is simple: to protect
competition in the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an efficient allo-
cation of resources”. European Competition Policy – Delivering Better Markets and Better Choices.
European Consumer and Competition Day, London, Sept. 5, 2005.
8The main limit of this study concerns its descriptive analysis. The author simply compared
proportions and didn’t use any statistical tests. In addition, no trend analysis or autocorrelation
detection was implemented at all. In fact, the possibility of collecting more data and using more
sophisticated methods that weren’t available at that time would have permitted to extract – in a
much more convincing way – the main determinants of the DOJ activity.
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the monopolist’s deadweight loss. For instance, Long et al. used DOJ data over the
period 1945-1970. The authors performed a linear regression between filed cases and
welfare losses, profit rates, outputs, and concentration ratios. They also dealt with
determining the impact of concentration on the market. Results showed that when
concentration rose, more cases were being filed against the given industry. However,
the number of cases didn’t increase at the same rate as market concentration, and even
may have decreased above a certain threshold. Despite the large number of studies,
this cost/benefit approach suffered from one major flaw: Assessing the monopolist’s
deadweight loss was rather inconvenient. The methodology failed to provide strong
evidence. Nevertheless, one of Long’s appealing results is that cases filed to the DOJ
do not fit those Harbeger’s model would provide. In other words, ceteris paribus, cases
filed to the DOJ are not the ones that lead to higher welfare losses. This result is in
the same vein of the public choice school; antitrust policy goal is not linked to the
economist’s conception of social welfare (McChesney et Shughart II, 1995).
 The discrete choice approach. More recently econometrics and discrete choice
modeling marked another milestone in antitrust methodology. More sophisticated
models allow one to take into account a large range of economic variables and to test
their significance. Coate et al. (1992) estimated a probit model of 70 FTC merger
cases between 1982 and 1987.9 Three variables of the U.S. Merger Guidelines appeared
significant: barriers to entry, collusion, and efficiency gains. They showed efficiency
considerations over the period didn’t affect the authority’s decision to accept or block a
merger. They also found that political pressure from Congress was a significant factor.
Khemani and Shapiro’s work (1993) was close but looked at Canadian data. Market
shares and concentration were the more important factors that explained authority’s
decisions in terms of concentration. Barriers to entry and foreign competition remained
less significant. Weir (1992, 1993) studied the UK’s merger decisions using a probit
model, too. He found that post-merger market shares didn’t influence the decision-
making process but made antitrust competition less likely to accept hostile takeovers.
 Event study approach. Lastly, event studies from the financial literature have
been carried out with antitrust data.10 Event studies are based on the market efficiency
hypothesis (Fama, 1970), i.e. stock prices reflect complete information about business
activity. A market model (Capital Asset Pricing Model) is estimated to study stock
price reactions to merger announcements. In that type of model, stock price is pro-
portional to market returns. According to Brady et Feinberg (2000)11, merger control
has a direct impact on individual company stock. With the same methodology, Aktas
et al. (2004) analyzed market responses to the EC announcements. They showed that
the market clearly reacted to the Commission’s decisions and that the probability of
its intervention was not linked to acquirer’s nationality. However, if the authority
intervenes, the market anticipates a more costly operation when the acquirer is a non-
European firm. Another example is Duso et al. (2003) who used event study analysis
9The first paper using discrete choice modeling to assess an authority is Barton’s (1979) which
implemented a logit model to estimate the logics of Federal Communication Commission’s decisions.
10For further readings on event study analysis, see MacKinlay (1997).
11Their sample includes 27 firms from the Financial Times magazine.
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of stock data to evaluate European merger control in terms of political economy. They
found that the protection of consumer surplus was not the only motive of the EC :
The institutional and political environment did matter. Still, their data suggested
that the Commission’s decisions were not sensitive to firms’ interests. Instead, results
suggested that other factors – such as country and industry effects, as well as market
definition and procedural aspects – did play significant roles. To sum up, a lot of work
has been done with stock data from merging parties’ competitors. Yet, we should
interpret results with care because if the situation was so simple antitrust authorities
would just look at stock exchange instead of carrying out a long and costly market
analysis.
This brief survey reveals that competition authorities are not always guided by
economic principles. Although it is well established that barriers to entry and market
power are decision variables, other elements like political influences seem to interact
too. We need to further investigate in order to stress which elements out of the
economic sphere could be relevant for the European merger control.
1.2 The starting point of the study
Our paper follows three recent studies of European antitrust authorities’ decisions:
Bergman et al. (2005), Schinkel et al. (2006), and finally Duso et al. (2006). First,
Bergman et al. deal with 96 merger cases between 1990 and 2004 (after sampling and
removing incomplete data). The dependant variable is the type of decision. Contrary
to our analysis, they study accepted and rejected merger decisions with logit modeling.
They find that the probabilities of a Phase II request and of a prohibition of the merger
increase with the parties’ market shares. The probability also depends on barriers to
entry and facilitating practices of collusion. No political influence affects the decision
making process.12 Barriers to entry appear to be strongly significant (at 1 % level).
Sectors are relevant too (water and construction).
Schinkel et al. (2006) focus on antitrust cases (no merger cases). Their main
contribution consists of an econometric analysis of EC’s appeals decisions between
1964 and 2002. Their data cover all antitrust decisions by the EC up till 2002. In a
first descriptive step, they investigate the EC fining policy and find that the European
agency imposes highest fines to horizontal cases. This category has experienced the
“the fastest rise in average as well as sum of total fines”. In a second step, they use a
binary probit model show that the notified case in which abuse of dominance plays a
role are more likely to result in infringement. Commissioners matter, too. Secondly,
they observe that the probability of going into appeal (for infringement cases) does
depend on the level of fines imposed on the parties: the higher the fine the higher the
probability of appeal. Lastly, unsurprisingly the number of parties also increases the
likelihood of appeal.
12The authors assess political influence on the authority’s decision-making with dummy variables
such as commissioners and countries of origin. Janin et Menoni (2005) use French merger data and
reach the same conclusions. Political factors have a low influence on French authority’s final decisions.
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Duso et al. (2006) use an event study to analyze the competitive outcome of
merger remedies. Their sample includes 168 concentrations between 1990 and 2002.
Two specific days are relevant in their analysis: (i) the announcement day, i.e. stock
prices provide information about whether the merger is likely to create anticompetitive
concerns; (ii) the day when the EC makes its decision, i.e. stock prices reflect the
outcome of the bargaining process between the agency and the parties. First, the
authors assess the weighted average abnormal returns of all firms (insiders/outsiders),
which give a measure of merger profitability. Then, using regression techniques they
estimate the degree of effectiveness of an antitrust action. Their results show that
merger remedies are not always appropriately imposed. Also, they conclude that the
market can predict remedies’ effectiveness when applied in Phase I. However, they
find that remedies appear to be less effective in Phase II maybe due to the increased
merging firms’ bargaining power during at the last stage of the merger review.
Two elements distinguish this paper. First, to our knowledge, except for Duso
et al. (2006) in a context of an event study analysis, this is the only econometric
work that differentiates structural and behavioral remedies. And our database covers
fifteen years, i.e. the whole period of the first merger regulation and one year of the
new reform. The other originalities are an appealing data analysis and the choice of a
multinomial logit model.
2 Modeling the merger remedy process
2.1 Model specification
Discrete choice models have been largely used in various research areas: transportation,
economics, marketing, behavioral sciences, etc.13 They have proved their efficiency in
estimating individual choice probabilities with a set of mutually exclusive alternatives.
These models are usually consistent with random utility theory, i.e. individuals are
supposed to choose the alternative associated with the maximum utility.
In modeling remedies in the European merger control, we use a multinomial logit
model (MNL). We first assume that the authority can choose from a set of alternatives:
structural remedies, behavioral remedies, both remedies or neither of them. At the
i-th merger proposal, it receives utility from each alternative j such as
Uij = βxij + ij (1)
where x represents a vector of covariates, such as merging firms’ characteristics (market
shares, location etc.) and various market indicators (sector, barriers to entry, etc.).
β is the respective coefficient vector. The authority will choose an alternative that
maximizes utility. When there are m choices, the probability of choice j is
13For a review of discrete choice models, see Train (2003). A classic econometric textbook is
provided by Greene (2003).
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Pr(yi = j) = Pr(Uij > Uik), ∀ j 6= k, j = 1, 2, . . . , k, . . . m. (2)
The dependent variable in our analysis is the type of acceptance made by the
antitrust authority when faced with a merger proposal. “Phase I without remedy”
(y = 0) is treated as a reference category. If we assume that all ij of the m choices
are independent, identically distributed with type I extreme value (Gumbel) distribu-
tion, McFadden (1973) has shown that the multinomial logit model has a closed-form
solution. The maximum likelihood estimation of the model is straightforward. The
probability of choosing an alternative j among m can be written such as
Pr(yi = j) =
exiβj
1 +
∑m
k=1 e
xiβk
, ∀ j = 1, 2, . . . ,m . (3)
The marginal effects, which are partial derivatives of probabilities Pj with respect
to the set of characteristics, are calculated from multinomial logit results following the
equation below:
∂Pj
∂xi
= Pj
(
βj −
m∑
k=1
Pkβk
)
, ∀ j = 1, 2, . . . ,m . (4)
The sign and magnitude of this marginal variable have no direct relationship with
any specific coefficient (Greene, 2003). Elasticities of probabilities can also be com-
puted.
ηj =
∂Pj
∂xi
xi
Pj
= xi
(
βj −
m∑
k=1
Pkβk
)
, ∀ j = 1, 2, . . . ,m . (5)
The restriction of choosing a MNL is that we do not take into account the length
of the merger procedure. Imposing a remedy in Phase I or in Phase II is the same in
such setting. The MNL is based on a strong hypothesis: the ratio of the probabilities
of any two alternatives is independent from the choice set. This property is called
the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA), which may be a limitation in some
practical applications. Here, our data successfully passed the Hausman and McFadden
test, which was not surprising due to the type of data.
2.2 Database
Between 1990 and 2005, the EC receives 2,961 merger notifications. In respect to our
initial objective – studying merger remedies – we focus only on accepted cases (both
phases with and without remedies). Phase I remedies concern Art. 6.2 of the EC
Merger Regulation whereas Phase II remedies concern Art. 8.2.
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Our database consists of 229 accepted merger cases between February 1991 and
December 2005 (see table 1). Data were mostly collected from the EC’s online re-
sources14. The sample doesn’t account for most cases unconditionally accepted in
Phase I (Art. 6.1(b)) because they were not available15. These cases largely corre-
spond to merger decisions which don’t raise serious doubts about their compatibility
with the common market. We only obtained 15 merger reports from this category16.
Table 1: Case population and net sample (1990-2005)
Population Sample
Number of notified cases 2,961
Number of refused cases 211
(withdrawn, referred or blocked)
Number of accepted cases 2,750 229
Phase I Acceptance
accepted without remedy 2,513 15
accepted with remedies 134 115
Total Phase I 2,647 130
Phase II Acceptance
accepted without remedy 28 27
accepted with remedies 75 72
Total Phase II 103 99
Out of 2,961 proper merger notifications, 83% were accepted in Phase I. Overall,
the authority imposed 209 remedies (134 + 75). The number of remedies increased
over the period. On one hand, the Commission tends to impose remedies more often
in Phase I, which shows a faster analysis when low-cost remedies are available. On
the other hand, when the case is more complex, Phase II investigations start and the
“stop the clock” option enables merging parties to get more time to propose adapted
remedies.
Detailed information was not available for 22 of the remedies. Consequently, the
sample consists of 130 cases in Phase I and 99 cases in Phase II. Overall, 54% of
remedies in Phase I were structural, 31% were behavioral, and 15% mixed both types
of remedies (see table 2). The conditioning of merger project with assets’ divesti-
ture prevails in Phase I. When we look at Phase II remedies, 36% were structural,
25% were behavioral, and 39% mixed both types of remedies. Surprisingly, a mix of
both types is most represented in Phase II. A reason may be that the complexity of
14See http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/.
15The European Commission Web site doesn’t even list the cases.
16Actually these 15 cases contain slight commitments but we didn’t consider them as remedies
because they were only “[. . . ] restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the
concentration” (Art. 6.1(b)).
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Table 2: Types of remedies analyzed (1990-2005)
Structural Behavorial Both Total
Phase I 62 36 17 115
(percentage of Phase I) (54%) (31%) (15%)
Phase II 26 18 28 72
(percentage of Phase II) (36%) (25%) (39%)
Total 88 54 45 187
Phase II cases usually requires a more sophisticated remedy package to ensure that
the anticompetitive concern is resolved.
We only deal with one relevant market per case. The choice of that market de-
pends on the potential anticompetitive concern. Each time we choose the narrowest
market where competition could be hurt the most (Bergman et al.). Due to secret
business considerations, market shares are not easily available.17 Thus, we use 25%
range dummy variables to collect them. We also create dummy variables to code
firms’ location (see table 3) and sector information (see table 4). Also, the merged
entity’s worldwide turnover is reported from either EC decisions or business press.
The appendix lists every regressor variable and details the coding scheme.
3 Results
First we implement a neural data analysis in Section 3.1. Then, results from the
multinomial logit model are provided in Section 3.2.
3.1 Mapping the choice of a remedy
Here Self-Organized Maps (SOM) provide a preliminary analysis of the data. SOMs
– a type of artificial neural network (ANN) – offer an original data analysis.18 More
precisely, we use one specific type of SOM, Kohonen’s maps, which are used to perform
tasks such as data exploration, classification, forecasting and optimization (Kohonen,
2000). Properties of Kohonen’s maps are twofold. First, the dimensionality number
of data is shrunk, as it is in projection methods (principal components analysis), and
input data are projected onto a discrete space where topological aspects of observa-
tions space are preserved. Secondly, similar inputs are represented by one prototype
17Actually market delineation or market share estimations are not completely objective and may
be argued between merging parties and the competition authority.
18ANNs simulate the activity of the human brain. Detailed discussion about ANNs is beyond the
scope of this paper, but curious readers are invited to read Haykin (1999).
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vector – a node – on the map that is surrounded by other prototypes related to neigh-
boring inputs. With an unsupervised algorithm, such quantification leads to classify
input data. Kohonen’s maps appear straightforward: Two “cases” that share close
characteristics are represented by two neighboring nodes. By interpreting the distance
between nodes, we make explanations more intuitive. Several studies underline that
SOM outperforms more traditional approaches (Cottrell et Rousset, 1997). Kohonen’s
maps not only improve projection and classification, but also can handle non linearity
and low-frequency events, which is useful in our case.
We used the Som ToolBox19 package to generate the maps (see the appendix).
The comparison of the U -matrix (see figure 6) – where the eight alternatives are
represented – and the influence of one variable in the activation of nodes (see figures
1-5) provides relevant information. First, vertical mergers (Vmerger) often lead
to a Phase I decision. In practice, if a anticompetitive concern is raised, antitrust
authorities privilege behavioral remedies when vertical relations are concerned. Those
commitments provide other market participants with access to key assets such as
infrastructure or technology (Alcatel / Thomson, 1998).
Secondly, if we look at firms’ countries of origin, the maps show that merger cases
involving French firms usually lead to a remedy outcome. The country of origin also
matters when U.S. firms are concerned. Mergers involving American acquired firms
require structural remedies in Phase I (Monsanto / Pharmacia & Upjohn, 2000; United
Airlines / U.S. Airways, 2001). On the acquired side, not surprisingly, cases involving
several firms of various nationalities (Crew-r) are correlated with remedy decisions;
more specifically, behavioral remedies. And when Deutch firms are being acquired
(Hol-d), the authority often requires structural outcomes in Phase I (Syngenta CP /
Advanta, 2004).
Another interesting result is the influence of merging firms’ turnover. Structural
remedies are often used when dealing with high post-merger turnovers (Elf Atochen /
Rütgers, 1994 ; Carrefour / Promodès, 1999 ; AT&T / Mediaone, 1999). A size effect
may play a role in the decision (Turnover and Crew-r).
Lastly, sectors play a significant role in shaping a remedy such as in the “Electricity,
gas and water supply” industry. Granting access is the most common remedy in use for
the energy sector (Total / Gaz de France, 2004). This sector is characterized by high
fixed costs, which make it more difficult to impose structural remedies on its firms.
And if structural remedies are possible, behavioral remedies are also included in the
remedy package to make sure the asset will remain viable once the concentration is
done (Verbund / Energy Allianz, 2002).
19See http://www.cis.hut.fi/projects/somtoolbox/.
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3.2 The multinomial logit model
Tables 5, 7 and 9 present the estimated coefficients of the three MNL models20 based on
the general specification presented in equation (3). The models could not be computed
with the whole set of regressors because of multicolinearity with dummy variables.
The previous neuronal analysis and significant coefficients helped us screen a more
restrained set of reasonable variables.
As Greene underlines, “the coefficients in this model are difficult to interpret” (2003,
p. 722). Consequently, we adopt the following methodology. We first estimate the
models and select one by looking at three criteria: regressor significance, percentage of
correct predictions, and the pseudo R2. We then compute elasticities of probabilities
using the formula in (3) and comment on their sign and magnitude to find the main
determinants of each alternative. Tables 6, 8 and 10 report the elasticities.
3.2.1 Model #1: Conditioning a merger
In the first model, we use a four-alternative specification of the empirical model, based
on the differences between conditional acceptances or no remedies and discrimination
by phase. Market power variables only appear significant for acquired firms. Low
and medium market shares of acquired firms positively determine remedy decisions in
Phase I (Acquid1, Acquid2). Size effect variables don’t appear to be good predictors
for this model because neither post-merger turnover (Turnover) nor world leader
(Worldleader) variables are below a 10% significance level.
The influence of “political variables” is less standard in earlier studies but more in
the line of recent commentaries in the media. Former European Antitrust chief Mario
Monti appears strongly significant at the 1% level. His work had an important role in
the choice of a conditional acceptance in Phase I (Monti).21 Unlike Bergman et al.
(2005), we found that his role as the head of the Antitrust Section undoubtedly affected
merger decisions. Although his influence was largely stressed in the media, it was not
found in previous empirical works. A focus on remedies seems to unveil his impact,
whereas the simple modelization of the acceptance/rejection process hadn’t underlined
it. Surprisingly, the French nationality of the acquirer firm (Fra-r) is another political
variable that is correlated with remedy decisions in Phase I (Hoechst / Rhône Poulenc,
1999; Masterfood / Royal Canin, 2002; Alcan / Pechiney, 2003). Lastly, Germany
turns out to be significant, too. The German nationality of the acquirer (Ger-r)
positively influences a Phase II decision (with or without remedies).
Market variables are also significant and present expected signs. As several studies
show, barriers to entry – significant at least at the 5% level – are one indicator of
a remedy outcome (Entry). Precisely, barriers to entry in the relevant market are
20All estimations were carried out using Limdep software.
21In the press, Monti was dubbed as “Super Mario” when he blocked several mergers such as the
GE/Honeywell case (see, for instance, “Super Mario: EU’s Antitrust Czar isn’t Afraid to Say No”,
Wall Street Journal. October 2, 2000) or when he investigated Microsoft bundling practices.
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more likely to condition a merger in Phase II. Another interesting result is that a
group of firms being acquired positively influences the authority’s acceptance without
any remedies (Crew-d).
If we now look at the various industry sectors, elasticities show that transporta-
tion and communications sectors positively impact the probabilities of acceptance in
Phase I (Sectori). Next, mergers taking place in the retail trade sector also correlate
with Phase I decisions, but without any remedies (Sectorg).
The goodness-of-fit of this model seems good enough. The overall level of correctly
classified decisions is more than 57%.
3.2.2 Model #2: The full merger process
Our database allows us to refine the previous model by discriminating remedies in
three alternatives: structural, behavioral, and both. Thus, model #2 consists of eight
alternatives (Phase I / Phase II, No remedy / Structural / Behavioral / Both remedies).
First of all, elasticities of probabilities indicate that a change in barriers to entry
positively affects the probability of a behavioral remedy in Phase II. Actually, as soon
as concerns about entry are raised, the merger is always accepted with commitments
from the merging parties.
Results also indicate that a merger in communications or transportation industries
(Sectori) is likely to be accepted in Phase I (with any or access remedies). The
approach stresses the importance of high technology markets in designing behavioral
remedies (licences, industrial property rights). Imposing divestitures on an innovative
firm is sometimes counterproductive because merger efficiencies matter.
In regards to market shares, the acquired firm’s shares are still relevant, mostly
in Phase I (Acquid1, Acquid2). Also, high market shares of acquirers negatively
impact behavioral remedies (clearer for Acquir2 than Acquir3). When facing large
acquirers, structural remedies are likely to be preferred to access remedies. That result
differs from the model #1 result.
Compared to the first model, Fra-r, Monti and Sectori play the same role
in Phase I. Plus, the model performs well by correctly predicting the importance of
structural relief as highlighted in the “Merger Remedy Study” (op. cit.). The pseudoR2
for matching remedy choice, adjusted for degrees of freedom, is .15, and the parameter
estimates are reasonable. The percentage of correct prediction is 30%. The value is
rather low because we use eight alternatives. The model correctly predicts the choice
of structural and behavioral remedies in Phase I but cannot predict mixed remedies,
in either Phase I or in Phase II of the merger process.
3.2.3 Model #3: Integrating mixed remedies
Because of prediction problems encountered with alternative “both remedies” in model
#2, we adopt a different model specification. We reclassify remedies in two groups in-
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stead. As behavioral remedies are often included in divestitures packages, we integrate
the mixed alternatives (structural and behavioral) into the structural ones.
In many respects results are similar to model #2 results. Hmerger is mostly
significant at the 1% level. As shown in table 10, a horizontal merger has a positive
effect on the probability of acceptance without any remedies. Entry still contributes
to a remedy decision in Phase II (rather bahavioral).
Next, the choice of a structural remedy in Phase I is relatively unresponsive to
changes in high market shares (Acquir2, Acquir3). That contrasts with its strong
response to low market shares such asAcquid1. This is not surprising because mergers
of high market share firms are more likely to be cleared in Phase II investigations.
As in model #2, the probability of a structural remedy in Phase I significantly
increases if the acquired company is French (Fra-r). Few French cases were accepted
in Phase II of the merger process. More often, commitments are negotiated beforehand.
Lastly, former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti still has the same role in
this last model: He may encourage remedy decisions in Phase I in order to shorten
the decision-making process or to save authority’s resources (Monti).
We have partially reached the expected objective for model #3. Compared to
model #2, the percentage of correct predictions rose by 7 percentage points. But
we still encounter prediction problems as soon as an alternative includes behavioral
relief. This type of remedy would be difficult to predict through our political or market
variables. We would like to emphasize to our reader that our priority is to highlight
some characteristics that cause the European agency to require conditional acceptance.
Several hypotheses can be proposed to figure out the low predictive power of our
models. First, we faced a sampling problem. The acceptance without remedy in
Phase I was underrepresented. We couldn’t overcome the bias with our lack of infor-
mation. A sampling choice method was not carried out because we lacked so much
information. And the use of a MNL may be not an optimal choice if we consider the
sequential aspect of the merger process.22 A modelization with nested choices could
have been more appropriate. Nonetheless, the absence of post-merger data relative
to the choice of a given remedy kept us from selecting this structure. Finally, we
shouldn’t forget that the choice of regressors is important and the lack of information
about quantitative post-merger data and welfare effects cannot be ignored.
Conclusion
The paper investigates the use of merger remedies by the EC. After an overview of the
main studies that have assessed antitrust agencies’ efficiency, we built a new database
for 1990-2005 and analyzed the determinants of remedies with a multinomial logit
modelization.
22We computed a non-linear version of the MNL (Box-Cox transformation) without any more
powerful outcomes.
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In accordance with industrial and antitrust economic theory, we found that vari-
ables related to high market power led more frequently to a remedy outcome, whatever
the phase. Of particular interest were the characteristics of acquired firms. The market
power of the acquired firm determines the decision to launch Phase II investigations
that often end up with a structural remedy.
The approach stresses the importance of a size effect in the decision-making process:
Variables that reflect merging parties’ size encourage the Commission to opt for a
remedy outcome. Actually, firms with a high turnover are likely to be forced to divest
a part of their business as a condition to merge. Although this result didn’t appear
with MNL modelization, the result of Kohonen’s maps enables us to highlight this
aspect. Also, mergers involving several acquirers end up being conditioned with an
access remedy to the rival firms.
Three sector variables influence the authority: energy, communications and retail
trade. High-tech or know-how intensive sectors, such as energy and communications,
often invoke remedy decisions due to the concentration of the sector (economies of
scale). Access remedies are the most used in those two sectors to make sure intellectual
property rights (IPRs) won’t foreclose competitors. The retail trade sector positively
affects an outright acceptance.
Results also support that Mario Monti had an effect on the shape of the remedy
decisions. This is something new. So far, several studies couldn’t have detected his
influence on a merger being accepted or blocked. It is noteworthy that the remedy
approach sheds some new light on the issue. Countries of origin also reinforce the
political aspect of the decisions since U.S. and French acquirers lead to a merger
decision with commitments.
All things considered, the paper stresses the main criteria of conditioning a merger.
However, the predictive power of the models is not high enough to handle all types
of merger outcomes. This work is a guideline and complement to more descriptive
analyses such as the one released by the European Commission last October. A case-
by-case basis is still necessary despite the understaffed antitrust authority. Further
research could evaluate the cost of a remedy. This new information would permit a
more complex modelization of the merger process.
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Appendix
Regressors used in the model
Most of regressors are dummy variables.
Acquid1: 1 if the acquired firm’s market share range is [0, 25%[, 0 else.
Acquid2: 1 if the acquired firm’s market share range is [25%, 50%[, 0 else.
Acquid3: 1 if the acquired firm’s market share range is [50%, 75%[, 0 else.
Acquid4: 1 if the acquired firm’s market share range is [75%, 100%[, 0 else.
Acquir1: 1 if the acquirer’s market share range is [0, 25% [, 0 else.
Acquir2: 1 if the acquirer firm’s market share range is [25%, 50%[, 0 else.
Acquir3: 1 if the acquirer firm’s market share range is [50%, 75%[, 0 else.
Acquir4: 1 if the acquirer firm’s market share range is [75%, 100%[, 0 else.
Crew-d: 1 if the acquired consists of several firms, 0 else. This variable can reflect some bargaining
power.
Crew-r: 1 if the acquirer consists of several firms, 0 else. This variable can reflect some bargaining
power.
Entry: 1 if entry considerations are claimed, 0 else.
Fra-d: 1 if the acquired firm’s headquarters are located in France, 0 else.
Fra-r: 1 if the acquirer’s headquarters are located in France, 0 else.
Ger-d: 1 if the acquired firm’s headquarters are located in Germany, 0 else.
Ger-d: 1 if the acquirer’s headquarters are located in Germany, 0 else.
Hmerger: 1 for a horizontal merger, 0 else.
Hol-d: 1 if the acquired firm’s headquarters are located in the Netherlands, 0 else.
Hol-r: 1 if the acquirer’s headquarters are located in the Netherlands, 0 else.
Inter-d: 1 if the acquired firm’s is an international holding, 0 else.
Inter-r: 1 if the acquirer is an international holding, 0 else.
Jvmerger: 1 for a joint venture, 0 else.
Monti: 1 if Mario Monti was the European Competition Commissioner, 0 else.
Other-d: 1 if the acquired firm’s headquarters are located in another European country, 0 else.
Other-r: 1 if the acquirer’s are located in another European country before, 0 else.
Scan-d: 1 if the acquirer’s headquarters are located in Scandinavia, 0 else.
Scan-r: 1 if the acquirer’s headquarters are located in Scandinavia (including Denmark, Sweden,
Norway and Finland), 0 else.
Sectora to Sectoro: 17 dummy variables that describe activity sectors. We used the European
commission’s classification (Nace codes, see table 4). We removed Sector H, Sector M, Sector P, and
Sector Q since no cases entered those categories.
Turnover: this is the worldwide turnover of the merged entity (expressed in $ billions).
Uk-d: 1 if the acquired firm’s headquarters are located in the United Kingdom, 0 else.
Uk-r: 1 if the acquirer’s headquarters are located in the United Kingdom, 0 else.
Us-d: 1 if the acquired firm’s headquarters are located in the United States, 0 else.
Us-r: 1 if the acquirer’s headquarters are located in the United States, 0 else.
Vmerger: 1 for a vertical merger, 0 else.
World: 1 if the merger involves a world leader firm, 0 else.
18
Table 3: Merging firms’ countries of origin
Acquirer firms Acquired firms
FRANCE 17.2% 11.9%
GERMANY 18.0% 20.8%
INTERNATIONAL 7.2% 5.8%
THE NETHERLANDS 7.2% 8.4%
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 12.4% 18.6%
SCANDINAVIA 10.4% 8.8%
U.K. 10.4% 12.8%
U.S. 17.2% 12.8%
Table 4: Merging firms’ sectors
NACE Code Sector Frequency Percentage
Sector A Agriculture, hunting and forestry 3 1.31%
Sector B Fishing - -
Sector C Mining and quarrying 4 1.75%
Sector D Manufacturing 142 62.01%
Sector E Electricity, gas and water supply 14 6.11%
Sector F Construction 2 0.87%
Sector G Wholesale and retail trade 4 1.75%
Sector H Hotels and restaurants 1 0.44%
Sector I Transport, storage and communication 39 17.03%
Sector J Financial intermediation 9 3.93%
Sector K Real estate, renting and business activities 2 0.87%
Sector L Public administration and defence 1 0.44%
Sector M Education - -
Sector N Health and social work 2 0.87%
Sector O Other community, social and personal service activities 6 2.62%
Sector P Activities of households - -
Sector Q Extra-territorial organizations and bodies - -
TOTAL 229 1
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Table 5: MNL coefficient estimates (model 1)
Variables Phase I remedies Phase II without remedy Phase II remedies
ACQUID1 3.7239*** 3.3726*** 2.6428**(1.04) (1.11) (1.05)
ACQUID2 2.5634** 1.8446* 1.8526*(1.00) (1.10) (1.01)
CREW-D -4.1426** -2.7001 -4.8467**(1.92) (2.26) (2.17)
ENTRY 2.0311** 2.0614** 2.8287***(.85) (.93) (.86)
FRA-R 2.7964** 1.4773 2.2860*(1.23) (1.43) (1.25)
GER-R -.0361 1.9470** 1.1964(.90) (.93) (.87)
HMERGER -2.9953*** -4.2529*** -2.7440**(1.08) (1.14) (1.08)
MONTI 3.7924*** 4.2012*** 4.2012***(1.37) (1.43) (1.39)
SECTORG -4.5782** -2.9470 -4.1674**(2.07) (1.91) (1.88)
SECTORI -.6435 -1.9235** -1.6383**(.78) (1.04) (.83)
Pct. Correct 57.64
Pseudo R2 0.18
∗ Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
Table 6: Averages of individual elasticities of probabilities (model 1)
Variables Phase I without remedy Phase I remedies Phase II without remedy Phase II remedies
ACQUID1 0 .3418 .1316 -.3050
ACQUID2 -.6697 .1474 -.0817 -.0791
CREWD .0691 -.0213 .0102 -.0367
ENTRY 0 -.1263 -.1112 .2707
GERR -.1963 -.2034 .1863 .0388
FRAR -.4646 .0605 -.1872 -.0354
HMERGER 2.0930 -.1699 0 .0200
MONTI 0 .1126 -.2626 -.0466
SECTORG .0511 -.0289 -.0004 -.0217
SECTORI .1443 .0347 -.1833 -.1347
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Table 7: MNL coefficient estimates (model 2)
Variables S1 B1 S1/B1 No S2/B2 S2 B2 S2/B2
ACQUID1 3.8598*** 3.2202*** 2.5674** 4.0804*** 1.9743 2.6055*** 2.888**(1.15) (1.17) (1.23) (1.21) (1.23) (1.23) (1.19)
ACQUID2 3.0952** 2.6081** 1.7068 3.0337** 2.0765* 1.9479 2.5774**(1.22) (1.24) (1.33) (1.3) (1.29) (1.35) (1.26)
ACQUIR2 -0.731 -1.8067** -0.6287 -0.6688 -0.1718 -1.8246* -1.7961**(0.87) (0.93) (0.97) (0.94) (0.94) (1.04) (0.93)
ACQUIR3 -1.3812 -1.4135 -1.2096 -1.5088 -1.886 -1.4627 -3.6944**(1.11) (1.12) (1.26) (1.25) (1.33) (1.23) (1.48)
ENTRY 1.8414** 1.1104 0.9876 1.7496** 1.8218** 3.06*** 2.3674***(0.78) (0.82) (0.89) (0.84) (0.83) (0.92) (0.83)
FRA-R 1.5618* 1.7543* 1.9488** 0.5434 0.9745 2.25 0.3582(0.95) (0.97) (1.01) (1.17) (1.04) (1.06) (1.16)
HMERGER -3.2778*** -2.6336*** -2.803*** -4.1073*** -2.3684** -3.5344*** -2.4976**(0.98) (1.01) (1.06) (1.03) (1.04) (1.04) (1.03)
MONTI 3.6266*** 3.2668*** 3.3351*** 3.1941*** 3.2168*** 2.854** 3.4373***(1.17) (1.18) (1.22) (1.21) (1.2) (1.25) (1.2)
SECTORI -1.0466 0.0135 -0.9761 -1.8944* -1.7537* -1.953* -1.3319(0.82) (0.81) (0.96) (1.05) (1.04) (1.07) (0.92)
Pct. Correct. 30.13
Pseudo R2 0.12
∗ Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
Table 8: Averages of individual elasticities of probabilities (model 2)
Variables No S1/B1 S1 B1 S1/B1 No S2/B2 S2 B2 S2/B2
ACQUID1 0 .4668 .0842 -.3064 .5988 -.6612 -.2836 -.1146
ACQUID2 -.7804 .2063 .0510 -.2363 .1867 -.1184 -.1594 .0412
ACQUIR2 .3318 .0222 -.4335 .0655 .0485 .2590 -.4411 -.4290
ACQUIR3 .2095 -.0016 -.0066 .0246 -.0211 -.0788 -.0141 -.3552
ENTRY -.9275 -.0108 -.3747 -.4358 -.0565 -.0205 .5959 .2511
FRA-R -.2827 .0106 .0467 .0832 -.1806 -.0997 .1398 -.2154
HMERGER 2.0666 -.4096 .0770 -.0509 0 .2774 -.6035 .1798
MONTI 0 .1509 -.0393 -.0032 -.0777 -.0656 -.2574 .0508
SECTORI .1300 -.0483 .1323 -.0363 -.1927 -.1687 -.2026 -.0969
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Table 9: MNL coefficient estimates (model 3)
Variables
Phase I
structural
remedies
Phase I
behavioral
remedies
Phase II
without
remedies
Phase II
structural
remedies
Phase II
behavorial
remedies
ACQUID1 4.0095*** 3.4814*** 4.0503*** 3.0663** 2.6856**(1.27) (1.32) (1.27) (1.21) (1.27)
ACQUID2 3.2961*** 2.9237** 3.0451** 3.0618** 2.1503(1.27) (1.32) (1.35) (1.27) (1.39)
ACQUIR2 -.5743 -1.7999** -.5097 -.9240 -1.7162*(.88) (.95) (.95) (.89) (1.05)
ACQUIR3 -1.5609 -1.5035 -1.8285 -3.1498*** -1.8220(1.09) (1.11) (1.23) (1.21) (1.22)
CREW-D -3.9914** -3.1609* -2.4426 -4.2426** -3.5616(1.85) (1.90) (1.95) (2.01) (1.00)
ENTRY 1.6514** 1.2025 1.5642** 2.1237*** 2.8215***(.78) (.83) (.85) (.79) (.90)
FRA-R 2.3517** 2.3848** 1.1522 1.4067 2.7904**(1.11) (1.14) (1.30) (1.16) (1.21)
HMERGER -3.2722*** -2.8936*** -4.2186*** -2.5110** -3.7151***(1.04) (1.08) (1.09) (1.04) (1.10)
MONTI 3.9473*** 3.6107*** 3.4107*** 3.7163*** 3.1806**(1.26) (1.28) (1.30) (1.27) (1.33)
Pct. Correct. 37.12
Pseudo R2 0.14
∗ Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
Table 10: Averages of individual elasticities of probabilities (model 3)
Variables Phase I
without
remedies
Phase I
structural
remedies
Phase I
behavioral
remedies
Phase II
without
remedies
Phase II
structural
remedies
Phase II
behavorial
remedies
ACQUID1 0 .3603 .0443 .3846 -.2040 -.4318
ACQUID2 -.9227 .1280 .0093 .0480 .0533 -.2372
ACQUIR2 .3189 .0756 -.4435 .1030 -.0725 -.4081
ACQUIR3 .2450 .0064 .0152 -.0345 -.2364 -.0335
CREW-D .0604 -.0267 -.0086 .0071 -.0322 -.6299
ENTRY -.8977 -.0756 -.2991 -.1190 .1595 .5069
FRA-R -.3967 .0449 .0511 -.1803 -.1326 .1273
HMERGER 2.1572 -.3149 -.0289 0 .2602 -.6494
MONTI 0 .1356 -.0423 -.1480 .0135 -.2695
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Figure 6: U -matrix for the EC merger data set
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